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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to determine whether a New Jersey statute 
that makes it illegal to possess large capacity magazines 
(“LCMs”) – defined as magazines capable of holding more 
than ten rounds of ammunition – violates the Second 
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, or the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  But we 
cannot answer that question, since it has already been 
answered.  A prior panel of our court reviewed that statute, 
known as Assembly Bill No. 2761 and codified at N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:39-1 (“the Act”), on appeal from an earlier order of 
the District Court denying a preliminary injunction.  It upheld 
the District Court’s order and, in doing so, went beyond simply 
answering the question of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success 
on the merits.  It directly addressed the merits of the 
constitutionality of the Act, holding that the Act did not violate 
the Second, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments.   
 
On remand, the District Court ruled on summary 
judgment that it was bound by that earlier decision and so 
upheld the constitutionality of the Act.  The plaintiffs have now 
appealed again, arguing that the District Court erred in treating 
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the prior panel’s opinion as binding and arguing again that the 
Act is unconstitutional.  Because they are wrong on the first 




In 2018, New Jersey enacted Assembly Bill No. 2761, 
a law making it illegal to possess a magazine capable of 
holding more than ten rounds of ammunition.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:39-1(y), 2C:39-3(j).  Prior to that, it had been illegal in 
New Jersey to possess magazines capable of holding more than 
15 rounds of ammunition.  Owners of LCMs had several 
options for complying with the new Act:  
 
Specifically, the legislation g[ave] LCM owners 
until December 10, 2018 to (1) modify their 
LCMs “to accept ten rounds or less,” id. at 
2C:39-19(b); (2) render firearms with LCMs or 
the LCM itself inoperable, id.; (3) register 
firearms with LCMs that c[ould not] be 
“modified to accommodate ten or less 
rounds,” id. at 2C:39-20(a); (4) transfer the 
firearm or LCM to an individual or entity entitled 
to own or possess it, id. at 2C:39-19(a); or (5) 
surrender the firearm or LCM to law 
enforcement, id. at 2C:39-19(c). 
 
Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 
910 F.3d 106, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Prior Panel Opinion”) 
(footnote omitted).  The statute exempts active military 
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members and active and retired law enforcement officers.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-3(g), 2C:39-17. 
 
On the day the bill was signed into law, the plaintiffs 
filed this action,1 naming certain state and local law 
enforcement officials as defendants.  (For ease of reference, we 
refer to the defendants collectively as “the State.”)  The 
complaint alleges that the Act violates the Second Amendment, 
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  Prior Panel Opinion, 
910 F.3d at 111.  With their complaint, the plaintiffs also filed 
a motion for a preliminary injunction.  Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & 
Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Grewal, No. 3:18-cv-10507 (PGS) (LHG), 
2018 WL 4688345, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2018) (“Preliminary 
Injunction Opinion”).   
 
The District Court held a three-day hearing on the 
motion, during which the parties presented conflicting expert 
testimony on the use of LCMs in mass shootings, including the 
number of casualties involved and whether the Act would save 
lives during a mass shooting by forcing the shooter to pause 
 
1 The plaintiffs are the Association of New Jersey Rifle 
and Pistol Clubs, Inc. (“ANJRPC”), Blake Ellman, and 
Alexander Dembowski.  ANJRPC is “an eighty-year old 
membership organization, representing tens of thousands of 
members, many of whom possess large capacity magazines for 
self-defense.”  Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. 
Grewal, No. 3:18-cv-10507 (PGS) (LHG), 2018 WL 4688345, 
at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2018).  Ellman and Dembowski are 
members of ANJRPC who possess LCMs.  Id.  The plaintiffs’ 




and reload ammunition, thus allowing individuals time to 
escape or subdue the shooter.  Id. at *4-8.  The Court also heard 
testimony on whether LCMs are used in self-defense.  Id.  To 
distinguish law enforcement officers from the general public, 
the State offered expert testimony that both active and retired 
police officers who possess firearms are required to pass a 
qualification course bi-annually, using a weapon equipped 
with a 15-round magazine.  Id. at *5.  Ultimately, the District 
Court denied the preliminary injunction, remarking that “the 
expert testimony [wa]s of little help in its analysis.”  Id. at *8.   
 
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention that the Act 
violated the Second Amendment, the District Court applied the 
two-step analytical approach we set out in United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).  Preliminary 
Injunction Opinion, 2018 WL 4688345, at *9.  Marzzarella 
requires a court to ask first whether the challenged law imposes 
a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s guarantee of the right to bear arms.  If it does, the 
second step is to evaluate that law under some form of 
heightened scrutiny.2  614 F.3d at 89.  The level of scrutiny to 
 
2 There are three levels of scrutiny: rational basis 
review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.  In Binderup 
v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), we 
explained the three levels of scrutiny by saying: 
Depending on the importance of the rights 
involved and the nature of the burden on them, a 
law’s purpose may need to be only legitimate and 
the means to achieve it rational (called rational 
basis scrutiny); the purpose may need to be 
important and the means to achieve it 
substantially related (called intermediate 
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be applied is determined by whether the law burdens the core of 
the Second Amendment guarantee.  Id.  The “core … [of] the 
Second Amendment protects the right of law-abiding citizens to 
possess non-dangerous weapons for self-defense in the home.”  
Id. at 92.  See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
635 (2008) (explaining that the Second Amendment “elevates 
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”).  Laws that 
do burden that core receive strict scrutiny, whereas those that 
do not burden it receive intermediate scrutiny.  Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d at 89, 96-97.     
 
The District Court concluded that the New Jersey Act 
imposes a burden on the Second Amendment because 
magazines, including LCMs, are integral components of guns.  
Preliminary Injunction Opinion, 2018 WL 4688345, at *9-11.  
Having answered the step-one question from Marzzarella, the 
Court proceeded to the second step and determined that the law 
should be evaluated under intermediate scrutiny because the 
core of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is 
not burdened by the Act.  As the Court saw it, the Act “does not 
prohibit the possession of the quintessential self-defense 
weapon, the handgun,” nor does it “effectively disarm 
individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend 
 
scrutiny); or the purpose may need to be 
compelling and the means to achieve it narrowly 
tailored, that is, the least restrictive (called strict 
scrutiny).  The latter two tests we refer to 
collectively as heightened scrutiny to distinguish 
them from the easily met rational basis test. 
836 F.3d at 341. 
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themselves.”  Id. at *12 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 
Then, applying intermediate scrutiny, the District Court 
upheld the Act.  Id. at *12-13.  Intermediate scrutiny requires 
the government to prove that the objective of the government 
regulation is “significant, substantial, or important[,]” and that 
“the fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted 
objective [is] reasonable[.]”  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “The regulation need not 
be the least restrictive means of serving the interest, but may 
not burden more [conduct] than is reasonably necessary.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  The District Court concluded that New 
Jersey has a significant, substantial, and important interest in 
the safety of its citizens.  Preliminary Injunction Opinion, 2018 
WL 4688345, at *12.  While the Court did not make a 
definitive finding that the Act will significantly reduce 
casualties in a mass shooting by limiting the number of shots 
that can be fired from a single gun, it did decide that there was 
a reasonable fit between the Act and its stated object.  It said, 
“the expert testimony established that there is some delay 
associated with reloading, which may provide an opportunity 
for potential victims to escape or for a bystander to intercede 
and somehow stop a shooter.”  Id. at *12.  Finally, the Court 
concluded that the Act places a minimal burden on lawful gun 
owners because it does not impose a restriction on the number 
of magazines an individual may own and instead limits only 
the lawful capacity of a single magazine.  Id. at *13.   
 
The District Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims.  It concluded that there had 
been no taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
because the Act allows for gun owners to permanently modify 
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their magazines to accept ten rounds, and, if those magazines 
or guns cannot be modified, they can be kept as long as the 
owner registers them.  Id. at *16.  As to the plaintiffs’ argument 
that the Act violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection clause because it treats active and retired law 
enforcement officers differently than other individuals, the 
District Court concluded that law enforcement officers are not 
similarly situated to other New Jersey citizens for a number of 
reasons.3  Officers are required to pass gun safety 
requalification tests, which are not required of other 
individuals; officers have “an unusual ethos of public service 
… and are expected to act in the public’s interest[;]” and 
“retired police officers face special threats that private citizens 
do not[.]”  Id. at *14 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).   
 
Dissatisfied with the denial of their motion for a 
preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs appealed, but a divided 
panel of our Court affirmed.  Prior Panel Opinion, 910 F.3d at 
110.  The panel announced its holding in these straightforward 
words: “Today we address whether [the Act] violates the 
Second Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  
We conclude that it does not.”  Id.  While the panel explained 
 
3 The plaintiffs did not argue that the Act’s exemption 
for active military personnel violates the Equal Protection 
Clause but did argue that there was disparate treatment 
between retired police officers and military veterans.  The 
Court rejected that, saying, “there is no evidence to suggest that 
military veterans receive equivalent training [to law 
enforcement officers].”  Preliminary Injunction Opinion, 2018 
WL 4688345, at *14. 
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that its task was to “decide whether Plaintiffs have a reasonable 
probability of showing that the Act violates [these 
constitutional rights,]” id. at 115, it nevertheless immediately 
went beyond that task, reached the merits, and determined that 
the Act withstands the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.   
 
Addressing the Second Amendment claim, the panel 
applied the analytical approach from Marzzarella, as had the 
District Court.  Id. at 116-24.  First, it assumed without 
deciding that LCMs are “typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes and that they are entitled to Second 
Amendment protection.”  Id. at 117.  It then turned to the 
second step of Marzzarella and determined that intermediate 
scrutiny should apply because the Act does not burden the core 
Second Amendment guarantee, for five reasons: (1) it does not 
categorically ban a class of firearms but is rather a ban on a 
subset of magazines; (2) it is not a prohibition of a class of arms 
overwhelmingly chosen by Americans for self-defense in the 
home; (3) it does not disarm or substantially affect Americans’ 
ability to defend themselves; (4) New Jersey residents can still 
possess and use magazines, just with fewer rounds; and (5) “it 
cannot be the case that possession of a firearm in the home for 
self-defense is a protected form of possession under all 
circumstances.  By this rationale, any type of firearm possessed 
in the home would be protected merely because it could be 
used for self-defense.”  Id. at 117-18 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
The panel also agreed with the District Court that the 
Act survives intermediate scrutiny.  It recognized New Jersey’s 
significant, substantial, and important interest in protecting its 
citizens’ safety.  Id. at 119.  And, the panel said, the Act 
reasonably fits the State’s interest because, by reducing the 
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number of shots that can be fired from one gun, victims will be 
able to flee, bystanders to intervene, and numerous injuries will 
be avoided in a mass shooting incident.  Id. at 119.  The panel 
further decided that the Act did not burden more conduct than 
is reasonably necessary because it imposes no limit on the 
number of firearms, magazines, or ammunition an individual 
may possess, and there is no record evidence that LCMs are 
“well-suited or safe for self-defense.”  Id. at 122.  The panel 
also rejected the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment and Equal 
Protection Clause claims, for the same reasons as did the 
District Court.  Id. at 124-26.   
 
In ruling for the State, the panel’s decision was in line 
with the decisions of at least four other circuits that have 
decided that laws regulating LCMs are constitutional.  See 
Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(affirming grant of summary judgment upholding Maryland’s 
ten round limit); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 
F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding, on review from summary 
judgment, New York and Connecticut’s laws imposing a ten 
round limit); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 
F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming grant of summary 
judgment upholding City of Highland Park’s ten round limit); 
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“Heller II”) (affirming grant of summary judgment upholding 
D.C.’s ten round limit).4  
 
4 Since the prior panel opinion was issued, the First 
Circuit has also concluded that Massachusetts’s ten round limit 
is constitutional.  See Worman v. Healey, 922 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 
2019) (affirming grant of summary judgment upholding 
Massachusetts ten round limit).  The Ninth Circuit, however, 




The decision was not, however, unanimous.  The 
dissenting member of the panel said that, in two ways, the 
majority treated the Second Amendment differently from other 
parts of the Bill of Rights: first, the majority weighed the merits 
of the case in order to pick a tier of scrutiny, and second, the 
majority, while purporting to use intermediate scrutiny, 
actually applied rational basis review.  Id. at 126 (Bibas, J., 
dissenting).  Among other things, the dissent was concerned 
that the majority failed to demand actual proof to justify the 
State’s regulation, as heightened scrutiny demands in other 
contexts, and that the majority had likewise failed to put the 
burden of proof on the State to demonstrate that the regulation 
was sufficiently tailored.  Id.   
 
When the case was remanded to the District Court, the 
parties promptly filed cross-motions for summary judgment, 
and the State’s motion won.  Although the Court recognized that 
different standards apply at the summary judgment stage than 
at the preliminary injunction stage, it said that it was granting 
summary judgment because “the Third Circuit has issued a 
precedential decision that resolves all legal issues in this case 
and there remains no genuine disputes of material fact.”  (App. 
at 8.)  The District Court noted that the prior panel opinion said 
the Act does not violate the Second, Fifth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments, so there was “binding Third Circuit precedent 
that the New Jersey law is constitutional[.]”  (App. at 8-9.) 
 
 
than ten rounds is unconstitutional under either strict scrutiny 
or intermediate scrutiny.  Duncan v. Becerra, --- F.3d ---, No. 




 This timely appeal followed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION5  
 
“It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel 
in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels.”  (3d 
Cir. I.O.P 9.1.)  The plaintiffs argue, however, that we are not 
under that restriction here, for two reasons.  First, they contend 
the outcome can differ here because this appeal arises in a 
different procedural posture than did the earlier one, with 
different standards and different inferences in play.  Second, 
they say that the prior panel decision was clearly wrong and 
should be disregarded, to prevent manifest injustice.  Neither 
argument succeeds. 
 
True enough, the standards for obtaining a preliminary 
injunction and summary judgment are different.  Under the 
well-known standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction, 
the moving party must show “both a likelihood of success on 
the merits and a probability of irreparable harm.  Additionally, 
the district court should consider the effect of the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction on other interested persons and the 
public interest.” Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 
1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).  On summary 
judgment, by contrast, the moving party must establish that 
“there is not a genuine dispute with respect to a material fact 
 
 5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “It 
is well established that we employ a plenary standard in 
reviewing orders entered on motions for summary judgment, 
applying the same standard as the district court.”  Blunt v. 
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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and thus the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 
(3d Cir. 2014).  Our standards of review are also different.  We 
will affirm a district court’s order on a preliminary injunction, 
“unless the court abused its discretion, committed an obvious 
error of law, or made a serious mistake in considering the 
proof.”  Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1175.  On the other hand, we 
exercise plenary review over an order on summary judgment.  
Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265. 
 
But despite the differing standards pertaining to the 
differing procedural postures, a panel of our Court reviewing a 
decision on a preliminary injunction motion can indeed bind a 
subsequent panel reviewing an appeal from an order on 
summary judgment.  As then-Judge Alito explained in Pitt 
News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004),  
 
although a panel entertaining a preliminary 
injunction appeal generally decides only whether 
the district court abused its discretion in ruling 
on the request for relief and generally does not 
go into the merits any farther than is necessary to 
determine whether the moving party established 
a likelihood of success, a panel is not always 
required to take this narrow approach.  If a 
preliminary injunction appeal presents a question 
of law and the facts are established or of no 
controlling relevance, the panel may decide the 
merits of the claim. 
 
Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Thus, “[i]n the typical situation—where the prior panel stopped 
at the question of likelihood of success—the prior panel’s legal 
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analysis must be carefully considered, but it is not binding on 
the later panel.”  Id.  “On the other hand, if the first panel does 
not stop at the question of likelihood of success and instead 
addresses the merits, the later panel, in accordance with our 
Court’s traditional practice, should regard itself as bound by 
the prior panel opinion.”6  Id.  “We have recognized, however, 
that reconsideration is justified in extraordinary circumstances 
such as where: (1) there has been an intervening change in the 
law; (2) new evidence has become available; or (3) 
reconsideration is necessary to prevent clear error or a manifest 
 
6 There are sound reasons why a panel reviewing a 
ruling on a preliminary injunction should focus on the question 
of likelihood of success on the merits rather than reaching the 
merits of the claim before them.  Given the already-mentioned 
different standards on a motion for preliminary injunction and 
motion for summary judgment and our different standards of 
review, going to the merits on a preliminary record, under 
hurried circumstances, can lead to premature and less informed 
decisions.  On review at the preliminary injunction stage, a 
panel may conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion or commit obvious errors of law or serious mistakes 
in its findings of fact.  But a subsequent panel reviewing an 
order on summary judgment may, in its plenary review of the 
record, identify errors the district court committed that, while 
not obvious or serious, impact the analysis or outcome of a 
case.  We therefore make it a general practice to proceed 
cautiously, to avoid ending a case on review from a preliminary 
injunction when the record could be more developed on 
summary judgment and we can conduct a plenary review of 




injustice.”  Council of Alt. Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 
64, 69 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 
Here, the prior panel’s opinion immediately went 
beyond the question of likelihood of success and declared a 
holding on the merits.  Again, it held very plainly that the Act 
does not violate the Second Amendment, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  Prior Panel Opinion, 
910 F.3d at 110.  In short, it addressed the ultimate merits of 
the dispute, as the plaintiffs rightly admit.7  (Oral Arg. At 2:02-
40, https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/19-
3142_AssnNJRiflePistolClubsv.AttyGenNJ.mp3.)  And the 
panel did so primarily on the basis of facts that are 
uncontested.8   
 
7 See Prior Panel Opinion, 910 F.3d at 122 (“[W]e hold 
that laws restricting magazine capacity to ten rounds of 
ammunition do not violate the Second Amendment.”); id. at 
125 (“In short, the Act does not result in a taking.”); id. at 126 
(“[R]etired law enforcement officers are not similarly situated 
to retired military personnel and ordinary citizens, and 
therefore their exemption from the LCM ban does not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.”).   
 
8 The case-determinative facts here centered on 
reloading.  The District Court’s conclusion that the Act 
survived intermediate scrutiny relied on its finding that “there 
is some delay associated with reloading, which may provide an 
opportunity for potential victims to escape or for a bystander 
to intercede[.]”  Preliminary Injunction Opinion, 2018 WL 
4688345, at *12.  The prior panel also relied heavily on that 




To avoid the conclusion that the law of the case has been 
set and a precedent established,9 the plaintiffs do not argue that 
there has been an intervening change in the law or the 
discovery of new evidence, but they do point out an intervening 
procedural step in our Court.  They note that the State asked a 
motions panel of our Court to summarily affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment on remand but that the 
motions panel denied that request.  According to the plaintiffs, 
that means “the motions panel necessarily rejected [the State’s] 
argument that the prior merits panel’s denial of a preliminary 
injunction binds the outcome of this appeal.”  (Reply Br. at 2.)   
 
Not so.  According to our Internal Operating 
Procedures, we “may take summary action … if it clearly 
appears that no substantial question is presented or that 
subsequent precedent or a change in circumstances warrants 
such action.”  (3d Cir. I.O.P 10.6 (emphasis added)).  Thus, 
although we may choose to summarily affirm, a decision of a 
motions panel declining to affirm is not the same as a 
 
plaintiffs’ own witness before the District Court acknowledged 
that there would be some pause while a shooter reloaded.  
Preliminary Injunction Opinion, 2018 WL 4688345, at *6-7.  
And, on appeal, the plaintiffs have presented only legal, not 
factual, arguments. 
 
9 We have explained that “[u]nder the law of the case 
doctrine, once an issue is decided, it will not be relitigated in 
the same case, except in unusual circumstances.”  Hayman 
Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 1982).  
Thus, the prior panel’s opinion is both the law of the case and 
binding precedent.  
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determination that there is a substantial question left in the 
case.  It often means nothing more than that the presentation 
made by motion has left that particular motions panel 
wondering whether there is a substantial question.   
 
Moreover, we do not afford the same deference to 
decisions made by a motions panel that we afford to opinions 
by a merits panel.  Although “a merits panel does not lightly 
overturn a decision made by a motions panel during the course 
of the same appeal, we do not apply the law of the case doctrine 
as strictly in that instance as we do when a second merits panel 
is asked to reconsider a decision reached by the first merits 
panel on an earlier appeal.”  Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
FCC, 503 F.3d 284, 292 (3d Cir. 2007).  That is in part because 
litigants can seek en banc review and review by certiorari of 
merits panel decisions but do not have similar opportunities 
with respect to a motions panel decision.  Id. at 291-92.  Here, 
the order denying the motion for summary affirmance does not 
explain why the motion was being denied.  Thus, even if the 
decisions of the merits panel and the motions panel were in 
conflict (which they are not), the merits panel is the one owed 
deference. 
 
The plaintiffs next argue that we need not follow the 
prior panel’s decision because it is clearly wrong and would 
work a manifest injustice.  The burden that accompanies that 
contention is heavy.  The plaintiffs must “persuade us not only 
that our prior decision was wrong, but that it was clearly 
wrong[.]”  See In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 720-21 
(3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).  Similarly, a manifest 
injustice occurs only when there is “direct, obvious, and 
observable error[.]”  Manifest Injustice, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  “The law of the case will be 
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disregarded only when the court has a clear conviction of 
error[.]”  Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Mere doubt 
on our part is not enough to open the point for full 
reconsideration.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
There is certainly room for vigorous debate about the 
prior decision.  The thorough dissent shows that.  But whether 
we agree with the majority’s opinion or not, we cannot say that 
it is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.  Even if we ignore that 
many other circuit courts have reached the same conclusion as 
the prior panel, with respect to very similar laws, there is 
evident in the prior panel’s work thoughtful consideration of 
the record and the relevant legal principles.  Whether the prior 
panel ultimately got things wrong is not the question now.  The 
question is whether it went so far astray that its decision can be 
called clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.  The answer to that 
is no.  We are therefore bound to respect the decision rendered 
by the prior panel, which ends this appeal.10  
 
10 The dissent concludes that the law of the case doctrine 
does not bar our consideration of the merits of the parties’ 
dispute, for two reasons: first, the prior panel assumed without 
deciding that magazines holding more than ten rounds are 
protected under the Second Amendment, and, second, the prior 
panel was imprecise and interchangeably used the terms 
“magazines,” “LCMs,” and “large capacity magazines” to refer 
to magazines of different capacities and to magazines and 
firearms with different capabilities.  In our view, neither of 
those considerations affects whether we are bound by the prior 
panel’s decision.  Even though the prior panel assumed without 
deciding that magazines holding more than ten rounds are 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and 
its denial of the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary 
judgment. 
















not leave the parties’ rights unsettled.  That assumption was in 
plaintiffs’ favor, and, under that assumption, the prior panel 
clearly held that the Act does not violate the Second 
Amendment.  That holding settled the parties’ 
rights.  Similarly, the prior panel’s language describing 
magazines, even if not as precise as our dissenting colleague 
would like, does not, in our opinion, create anything that we 
can call clear error or manifest injustice and thus that would 
permit us to disregard the prior panel’s case dispositive 





MATEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
The majority concludes that a prudential principle bars 
our consideration of the meaning of the Constitution. But 
“[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
province of the courts,” The Federalist No. 78, at 525 
(Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961), and a judicially 
created tool for case management does not, in my opinion, 
supersede the expectation that the judiciary will decide cases 
and controversies arising under the Constitution. No doubt, 
there are rational reasons behind the “law-of-the-case 
doctrine.” Allowing courts to repeatedly consider questions 
already decided would undermine the stability and 
predictability of the law. In contrast, where issues remain 
undecided, or the assumptions underlying those decisions are 
unclear, then the opposite conclusion holds. And in such cases, 
the twin aims of finality—constancy and certainty—do not 
support limiting the judicial power granted in the Constitution 
and extended by Congress.  
This case, in my view, is an example of the latter 
category for two reasons. First, in Association of New Jersey 
Rifle and Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 
910 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018) (“NJ Rifle I”),1 the panel did not 
decide whether all “magazines” enjoy the guarantee of the 
Second Amendment under United States v. Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010); and second, the decision did not define 
what constitutes a “large capacity magazine.” Because both 
issues are central to the resolution of this case, I would decline 
to apply the law-of-the-case doctrine and would consider the 
issues raised by the appellant. Doing so, I would reverse the 
 
1 For convenience, I sometimes refer to the NJ Rifle I 




order of the District Court and remand this matter to permit the 
State to provide evidence that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-1(y) 
(“New Jersey Magazine Act” or “the Act”) is narrowly tailored 
to advance the State’s interests.  
Finally, given the difficulty applying our existing 
framework in cases implicating the Second Amendment—
illustrated by the deeply reasoned, but still deeply divergent 
opinions in NJ Rifle I—I believe we should reconsider our 
decision in Marzzarella in favor of a standard that draws on the 
text, history, and original meaning of the constitutional 
guarantee of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” 
U.S. Const. amend. II. 
I. LAW-OF-THE-CASE DOCTRINE 
 
A. Background 
Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “one panel of an 
appellate court generally will not reconsider questions that 
another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case.” 
In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 1998). 
The doctrine does not appear in statute. Instead, it is a 
prudential limitation that “directs courts to refrain from re-
deciding issues that were resolved earlier in the litigation.” 
Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 
123 F.3d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1997). But “[t]he law of the case 
doctrine does not limit a federal court’s power; rather, it directs 
its exercise of discretion.” Id. It is, in short, a judicially created 
self-direction on when to choose to limit further judicial 
review. And the reasoning is simple: declining to reconsider 
issues in the same case “promotes the finality and efficiency of 
the judicial process by protecting against the agitation of 




486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). So a “settled” issue is the key and, in this 
case, I do not find the rights of the parties settled. 
B. The NJ Rifle I Decision 
NJ Rifle I concluded that “laws restricting magazine 
capacity to ten rounds of ammunition do not violate the Second 
Amendment.” NJ Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 122. That conclusion rests 
on assumptions about the scope of the constitutional right to 
keep and bear arms, and the technical operation of self-loading 
firearms. 
1. NJ Rifle I Did Not Decide That Magazines 
Holding More Than Ten Rounds Are Arms 
Protected under the Second Amendment 
I start by asking what constitutional question NJ Rifle I 
answered. We know the Second Amendment confers “an 
individual right to keep and bear arms.” District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 598, 622 (2008). We have also 
read Heller to require “a two-pronged approach to Second 
Amendment challenges.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. “First, 
we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on 
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee.” Id.  “If it does not, our inquiry is complete. If it 
does, we evaluate the law under some form of means-end 
scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that standard, it is 
constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.” Id.  
I do not read NJ Rifle I to have fully applied this 
framework. To begin, the majority opinion held that “a 
magazine is an arm under the Second Amendment.” NJ Rifle I, 




“arm” regulated by New Jersey in the Act. Quite differently, 
the opinion focused on what it viewed as a narrower category 
of magazines called “Large Capacity Magazines” or “LCMs.” 
Id. at 116–17. And then, the opinion “assume[d] without 
deciding that LCMs . . . are entitled to Second Amendment 
protection.” Id. at 117 (emphasis added). So are “LCMs” an 
“arm” under the Second Amendment? It is doubtful New 
Jersey thinks so. Indeed, when pressed at oral argument, the 
State declined to characterize NJ Rifle I as holding that such 
magazines enjoy constitutional protection.2 That waffling is no 
small matter. It would of course be significant that some 
twenty-two million individuals residing in our Circuit are left 
to wonder whether they have, since the Founding, surrendered 
a fundamental right. But that unanswered question takes 
sharper focus when coupled with a second: what, exactly, is a 
“Large Capacity Magazine?” 
  2. NJ Rifle I’s Alternating Technical Definitions  
Narrowing the issue presented from “magazines” to a 
specific kind of magazine appears, in my reading, to have 
obscured the reasoning in NJ Rifle I. Consider a few examples 
in which the terms “magazines,” “LCMs,” and “large capacity 
magazines” interchangeably refer to 1) magazines within the 
New Jersey Magazine Act because they can hold more than ten 
rounds of ammunition, id. at 110; 2) magazines subject to laws 
in other states limiting the amount of rounds of ammunition, 
id. at 110 n.1; 3) firearms with “combat-functional ends” 
capable of “rapidly” discharging ammunition, id. at 117 n.16; 
and 4) magazines used in fully-automatic firearms, id. at 119 
 






(citing NJ Rifle I App. at 1057, 1118–26). Each of these four 
concepts is different, yet they blend together throughout NJ 
Rifle I. For instance, early on the decision defines the term 
“LCM” to be coterminous with the object regulated by the New 
Jersey Magazine Act: magazines for semi-automatic firearms 
able to hold more than ten rounds of ammunition. Id. at 110 
(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-1(y)). A few pages later, the 
opinion states that “LCMs are used in mass shootings,” citing 
portions of the record that describe a host of different types of 
firearms—repeaters, semi-automatic, and automatic—and 
various sizes of magazines used in both automatic and semi-
automatic firearms. See id. at 119 (citing NJ Rifle I App. at 
1057 (defining “LCM firearms” to include “assault weapons” 
and “high-capacity semiautomatic firearms” and stating that 
those “LCMs” jointly “appear to account for 22 to 36% of gun 
crimes in most places”); NJ Rifle I App. at 1118–26 (describing 
sixty-one mass shootings and the weapons used, including 
repeaters, semi-automatic firearms, and automatic firearms, 
along with magazines of varying capacities, ranging from 13-
round magazines to 100-round magazines)). So the reader is 
left with the impression that the “LCMs” regulated in New 
Jersey are the same devices involved in a host of criminal acts 
across the country.  
But they are not. Yet blending together this wide 
assortment of firearms and regulatory structures is critical to 
the prior panel’s conclusion that “[n]ot only will the LCM ban 
reduce the number of shots fired and the resulting harm, it will 
present opportunities for victims to flee and bystanders to 
intervene.” Id. at 119. I do not see how the current record 
supports that inference. At best, the record could be read to 




array of violent acts some, all, or none of which are impacted 
by the New Jersey Magazine Act.  
3. The Cumulative Result 
It is the combination of these two unanswered questions 
that gives me greatest pause. The collective effect of declining 
to confirm that “large capacity magazines” enjoy constitutional 
protection while defining those same magazines to include 
sizes greater than the New Jersey Magazine Act allows leaves 
me unable to predict how the Second Amendment will apply 
in future cases. I do not believe the constitutional character of 
a “magazine” rises and falls on a single extra round of 
ammunition. Nor do I imagine the Second Amendment allows 
any government to diminish an individual’s rights through 
nomenclature. I am, however, confident that new restrictions 
on firearms will continue to flourish throughout our Circuit. 
Under NJ Rile I, that leaves District Court judges with the 
difficult task of determining whether a magazine is small 
enough to satisfy the Second Amendment or large enough to 
slip outside its guarantee. And it leaves this Court with the 
certainty that we will need to address those unanswered 
questions. 
Respectfully, we need not wait. “[T]he law of the case 
doctrine bars courts from reconsidering matters actually 
decided[;] it does not prohibit courts from revisiting matters 
that are ‘avowedly preliminary or tentative.’” Council of Alt. 
Pol. Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
18B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4478 (3d ed. 
1981)). So we have taken care to “to prevent the doctrine from 
being used to prevent a properly raised argument from being 




Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis in original). And that is why we have recognized 
that “[w]here there is substantial doubt as to whether a prior 
panel actually decided an issue, the later panel should not be 
foreclosed from considering the issue.” Id.   
Here, there is substantial doubt about whether all 
magazines enjoy the guarantee of the Second Amendment or 
if, instead, that protection turns on the number of rounds of 
ammunition inside. In my opinion, it is necessary to address 
that issue to settle the rights of the parties here. Given that 
uncertainty, I would decline to apply the law-of-the-case 
doctrine, as I do not believe it applies to these circumstances. 
For that reason, I would, and therefore do, consider the full 
question presented by the appellants.  
II. APPLICATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT  
A. The Scope of the Second Amendment 
I begin with Heller and the Supreme Court’s 
consideration of the text, history, and tradition of firearms 
regulations in the United States to best understand the meaning 
of the Second Amendment.  
Naturally, the Court began with the “operative clause” 
which provides that “the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 576, 578–79. 
The Court observed that “[t]he 18th-century meaning [of 
‘arms’] is no different from the meaning today.” Id. at 581 
(citing 1 S Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language 106 
(4th ed. 1773) (reprinted 1978) (defining “arms” as “[w]eapons 
of offence, or armour of defence”)); 1 Timothy Cunningham, 




as “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his 
hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.”); see also 
N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language 
(1828) (reprinted 1989) (similar)). With this foundation, the 
Court held that “the Second Amendment extends . . . to all 
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were 
not in existence at the time of the founding.” Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 582. In so holding, the Court rejected the “frivolous” 
argument “that only those arms in existence in the 18th century 
are protected by the Second Amendment.” Id. An unsurprising 
observation, because “[w]e do not interpret constitutional 
rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern 
forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 
U.S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to 
modern forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 35–36 (2001), the Second Amendment extends” to modern 
bearable arms. Id. 
Next, the Court held that “the most natural reading of 
‘keep Arms’ in the Second Amendment is to ‘have weapons.’” 
Id. As to “bear,” the Court held that “[w]hen used with ‘arms’ 
. . . the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a 
particular purpose—confrontation.” Id. at 584; see id. (“From 
our review of founding-era sources, we conclude that this 
natural meaning was also the meaning that ‘bear arms’ had in 
the 18th century.”). “Putting all of these textual elements 
together,” and drawing on historical context, the Court held 
“that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry 
weapons in case of confrontation.” Id. at 592, 595.  
But the Court acknowledged that “[l]ike most rights, the 
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. 
at 626. For example, it did “not read the Second Amendment 




confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to 
protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.” Id. at 
595 (emphasis in original). “From Blackstone through the 
19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely 
explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any 
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose.” Id. at 626. Rather, the Court acknowledged 
the propriety of “longstanding prohibitions on the possession 
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626–27. 
It also “recognize[d] another important limitation”: that “the 
sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the 
time.’” Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
174, 179 (1939)). The Court held that this “limitation is fairly 
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying 
of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
As a result, the Court held that “the Second Amendment does 
not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled 
shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the 
scope of the right.” Id. at 625. 
With this foundation, the Court turned to the handgun 
ban at issue, which prohibited keeping operable handguns in 
the home. Id. at 628. Rather than cabining the standard of 
review to a balancing of interests, the Court held that the law 
was unconstitutional because it banned an entire class of 
firearms commonly owned by citizens for the lawful purpose 
of self-defense in the home. Id. at 628–29. Although Heller 
focused its holding on the handgun ban before it, the Court 




evaluation,” the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all 
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to 
use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 635. Heller 
makes clear that judicial review of Second Amendment 
challenges proceeds from text, history, and tradition. This is 
because “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope 
they were understood to have when the people adopted them, 
whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges 
think that scope too broad.” Id. at 634–35.3 
B. Applying Heller and This Court’s Interpretative 
Framework 
Since Heller, circuit and district courts have varied in 
their approaches to evaluating the Second Amendment. Most 
have now settled on some version of the two-pronged approach 
we created in Marzzarella.4 As noted, we first “ask whether the 
 
3 Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the 
Supreme Court reiterated that the right to keep and bear arms 
is a “fundamental” constitutional right “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition.” 561 U.S. 742, 767–68, 778 
(2010) (citation omitted). 
4 See David B. Kopel, Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The 
Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment Doctrines, 61 St. Louis 
U. L. J. 193, 212 n.105 (2017) (citing N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); NRA v. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 
F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 
F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Chovan, 735 
F.3d 1127, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Reese, 





challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee,” and, if it does, 
“we evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny.” 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. I apply both steps, concluding that 
the New Jersey Magazine Act does not satisfy the rigorous 
scrutiny required for the fundamental rights of the Second 
Amendment. 
1. Step One: Determining Whether the Challenged 
Law Imposes a Burden on Conduct Falling 
Within the Second Amendment 
The “threshold inquiry, then, is whether [the Act] 
regulates conduct that falls within the scope of the Second 
Amendment.” Id. at 89. That analysis turns on “whether the 
type of arm at issue is commonly owned,” id. at 90–91, and 
“‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes,’ Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.” NJ Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 116. 
I conclude the magazines, including those regulated by the 
New Jersey Magazine Act, are protected arms under the 
Second Amendment as best understood by history and 
tradition.  
 i.  Defining the Regulated Arms  
I begin by defining the kinds of arms controlled by the 
New Jersey Magazine Act, which prohibits the possession of 
magazines “capable of holding more than 10 rounds of 
 
a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges to 
federal statutes.”) (internal quotations omitted); 
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261 n.34 
(11th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 




ammunition to be fed continuously and directly therefrom into 
a semi-automatic firearm.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-1(y).5 As 
ordinarily understood, a “magazine” is “a device that holds 
cartridges or ammunition.” NJ Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 116 (citing 
Magazine, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/magazine (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2018)). What is more, this contemporary 
definition tracks the ordinary understanding of magazines 
since at least the 1800s.6 Having defined what a magazine is, I 
 
5 At issue in this appeal are only magazines for semi-
automatic firearms. A “semi-automatic” firearm is “a weapon 
that fires only one shot with each pull of the trigger, and which 
requires no manual manipulation by the operator to place 
another round in the chamber after each round is fired.” Staples 
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602 n. 1 (1994). This is distinct 
from an “automatic” firearm, which “fires repeatedly with a 
single pull of the trigger. That is, once its trigger is depressed, 
the weapon will automatically continue to fire until its trigger 
is released or the ammunition is exhausted.” Id. Individual 
ownership of automatic firearms is prohibited in New Jersey. 
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-5(a) (making unlawful the 
possession of “a machine gun or any instrument or device 
adaptable for use as a machine gun”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-
1(i) (defining “machine gun” as “any firearm, mechanism or 
instrument not requiring that the trigger be pressed for each 
shot and having a reservoir, belt or other means of storing and 
carrying ammunition which can be loaded into the firearm, 
mechanism or instrument and fired therefrom”). 
6 Compare Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of 
the English Language 510 (1842) (defining “magazine” as “[a] 





next consider whether a magazine is an arm within the Second 
Amendment.   
As the Supreme Court explained in Heller, regulation 
requiring “that firearms in the home be rendered and kept 
inoperable at all times” is unconstitutional as it necessarily 
makes “it impossible for citizens to use them for the core 
lawful purpose of self-defense[.]” Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
From this holding flows the logical conclusion that the Second 
Amendment’s use of the term “arms” should be ordinarily 
understood as “operable arms,” meaning that the Second 
Amendment likewise guarantees components required to make 
a protected firearm work for self-defense. See Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 581. 
That necessarily includes ammunition and, by 
extension, magazines that hold ammunition, as components of 
an operable firearm. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 180 (observing that 
in the context of the colonial militia system, “[t]he possession 
 
which such store is deposited; New Illustrated Edition of Dr. 
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary of All the Words in the 
English Language 799 (1864) (defining “magazine” as “[t]o 
store up or accumulate for future use”); Webster’s Condensed 
Dictionary 336 (1887) (expanding the definition of “magazine” 
to include a “cartridge chamber of a repeating rifle”); 
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 590 (3d ed. 1917) (defining 
“magazine” to include “[a] chamber in a gun for holding 
cartridges to be fed automatically to the piece”); Merriam-
Webster Unabridged Dictionary (2020) (defining “magazine” 
to include “a supply chamber: such as . . .  a holder that is 
incorporated in or attachable to a gun and that contains 





of arms also implied the possession of ammunition, and the 
authorities paid quite as much attention to the latter as to the 
former”) (quoting The American Colonies In The 17th 
Century, Osgood, Vol. 1, ch. XIII). For these reasons, the best 
reading of “arms” in the Second Amendment includes 
magazines because “[a] regulation eliminating a person’s 
ability to obtain or use ammunition could thereby make it 
impossible to use firearms for their core purpose.” Jackson v. 
City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 
2014).  
ii.  History and Tradition: The Development 
of Magazine-Operated Firearms and the 
Regulations That Followed   
That a magazine is an “arm” does not foreclose 
governmental regulation because “the right secured by the 
Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
So I next consider what, if any, restrictions on magazines 
satisfy the history and tradition of the Second Amendment. 
Answering that question begins with a review of magazines 
and magazine-operated firearms to understand: 1) the use and 
ownership of these arms over time, 2) traditional regulations, 
and 3) common use. 
a.  The Development of Repeating Firearms 
“The desire for . . . repeating weapons is almost as old 
as the history of firearms, and there were numerous attempts to 
achieve this goal, beginning at least as early as the opening 
years of the 16th century.” Harold L. Peterson, Arms and 
Armor in Colonial America, 1526–1783, at 215 (1956). 
“Successful systems [of repeating arms] definitely had 




spread throughout most of Western Europe and even to 
Moscow.” Harold L. Peterson, The Treasury of the Gun 229 
(1962). “[T]he two principal magazine repeaters of the era 
[were] the Kalthoff and the Lorenzoni. These were the first 
guns of their kind to achieve success . . . .” Id. The Kalthoff 
repeater magazines held between six and thirty charges, and 
“were undoubtedly the first magazine repeaters ever to be 
adopted for military purposes.” Id. at 230. Also developed 
during the 17th century, the Lorenzoni was “a magazine-fed 
Italian repeating pistol that ‘used gravity to self-reload’” and 
held about seven shots. (Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of 
Second Amendment Law, et al. in Support of Appellants and 
Reversal (“Amici Professors”) at 12 (quoting Martin 
Dougherty, Small Arms Visual Encyclopedia 34 (2011)).) See 
also Gerald Prenderghast, Repeating and Multi-Fire Weapons: 
A History from the Zhuge Crossbow Through the AK-47, at 97 
(2018) (“The Lorenzoni is also referred to as the Cookson rifle 
by American collectors[.]”); David Westwood, Rifles: an 
Illustrated History of Their Impact 71 (2005).  
By the mid-17th century, Americans also began 
developing repeaters. These repeaters “often employed a 
revolving cylinder that was rotated by hand.” (Amici 
Professors Br. at 15 (citing 2 Charles Winthrop Sawyer, 
Firearms in American History 5 (1939) (six-shot flintlock); 
Charles Edward Chapel, Guns of the Old West 202–03 (1961) 
(revolving snaphance)).) For example, the Boston Gazette 
advertised the American Cookson in 1756 and boasted that it 
could “fire 9 Times distinctly, as quick, or as slow as you 
please[.]” Peterson, The Treasury of the Gun 232. In 1777, the 
Continental Congress ordered Belton rifles able to discharge 
sixteen or twenty rounds, but then later cancelled the order 




at 18.) See also 7 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–
1789, at 324, 361 (1907) (describing the ordering of Belton 
rifles and later the cancellation of the same rifles over Belton’s 
request for “an extraordinary allowance”); Peterson, The 
Treasury of the Gun 197. All of which documents both the 
existence and public knowledge of repeating weapons.  
That public knowledge grew into private practice by at 
least the early 19th century, when repeaters began circulating 
for personal use. For instance, in 1821, the New York Evening 
Post described the invention of a new repeater as “importan[t], 
both for public and private use,” whose “number of charges 
may be extended to fifteen or even twenty.” Newly Invented 
Muskets, N.Y. Evening Post, Apr. 10, 1822, in 59 Alexander 
Tilloch, The Philosophical Magazine and Journal: 
Comprehending the Various Branches of Science, the Liberal 
and Fine Arts, Geology, Agriculture, Manufactures, and 
Commerce 467–68 (1822). Technical challenges, however, 
limited widespread adoption and “none achieved real 
popularity.” Peterson, The Treasury of the Gun 199. 
Then, in the 1830s, Samuel Colt introduced the 
revolver, which fired repeating rounds using a rotating 
cylinder. Peterson, The Treasury of the Gun 202–03, 209–11 
(“The real father of the revolver in its modern sense, however, 
was Samuel Colt.”). See also Ian V. Hogg, The Complete 
Illustrated Encyclopedia of the World’s Firearms 40 (1978)  
(“[Colt] had developed a percussion revolver and patented it in 
England in 1835 and in America in 1836.”). By the mid- to late 
19th century, some revolvers could fire up to twenty-one 
rounds. David B. Kopel, The History of Firearm Magazines 
and Magazine Prohibitions, 78 Alb. L. Rev. 849, 856 (2015) 
(“Pin-fire revolvers with capacities of up to twenty or twenty-




repeating rifles could fire between fifteen and sixty shots per 
minute. Id. at 854. In addition, the lever-action repeating rifle 
arrived by the 1850s, and could fire thirty times per minute. Id. 
at 854–55. The arms development during this time was “fueled 
by the Civil War market.” Robert L. Wilson, Winchester: An 
American Legend (1991). 
b.  The Development of Semiautomatic 
Firearms and Magazines 
The first commercially successful rifles holding more 
than ten rounds of ammunition appeared around 1866, with 
handguns holding more than ten rounds following by 1935. See 
Kopel, The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine 
Prohibitions, 78 Alb. L. Rev. at 849–50. And “[o]wing to their 
simplicity and ease of use, by the mid-twentieth century the use 
of detachable magazines loaded through the base of the grip far 
exceeded all other loading methods.” Jeff Kinard, Pistols: An 
Illustrated History of Their Impact 174 (2003). Given that easy 
operation, “semiautomatic handguns grew from 28% of 
handgun production in 1973 to 80% in 1993.” (NJ Rifle I App. 
at 1272.) As they became more readily available, 
semiautomatic handguns gradually became more predominant.  
“Pistol magazines manufactured before September 1994 
commonly [held] five to 17 bullets, and magazines produced 
for some models [held] as many as 30 or more bullets.” (NJ 
Rifle I App. at 1060.) As for rifles, the AR-15 semiautomatic 
rifle appeared in 1963 and sold with a standard twenty-round 
magazine. Kopel, The History of Firearm Magazines and 
Magazine Prohibitions, 78 Alb. L. Rev. at 859–60. Since that 
time it has become “[t]he most popular rifle in American 




Possession of magazines exceeding ten rounds grew 
rapidly “given the growing popularity of semi-automatic rifles 
and of large-capacity handguns. Nearly 80 percent of 
ammunition magazines owned by gun owners at the time of [a 
1994] survey held fewer than 10 rounds.” Edward W. Hill, 
How Many Guns are in the United States: Americans Own 
between 262 Million and 310 Million Firearms, Urban 
Publications 3 (2013). By contrast, a market survey conducted 
in or around 2013 “of owners of semi-automatic assault 
rifles . . . showed that 63 percent of owners of these guns had 
ammunition magazines that held more than 10 rounds.” Id.  
Today, “there are at least 58.9 million civilian-owned 
[magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds] in the 
United States.” (NJ Rifle I Opening Br. at 17 (emphasis 
omitted) (citing Gary Kleck, How Many Large Capacity 
Magazines (LCMs) Are Possessed By Americans?, SSRN 
(2018)); see also NJ Rifle I App. at 275 (Tr. 372:14–16 
(Kleck)) (percentage of firearms with capacity to hold eleven 
or more rounds); App. at 516–17 (Hill, How Many Guns are in 
the United States: Americans Own between 262 Million and 
310 Million Firearms, Urban Publications).) “Magazines 
capable of holding more than 10 rounds come standard on 
some of the most popular handguns and rifles, including the 
most popular rifle in America.” (NJ Rifle I, Opening Br. at 17–
18) (emphasis omitted) (citing NJ Rifle I, App. at 696–704 
(Gun Digest 2018); App. at 753 (National Shooting Sports 
Foundation, Modern Sporting Rifle Comprehensive Consumer 
Report 2013 (2013); App. at 500 (Dan Haar, America’s Rifle: 
Rise of the AR-15, Hartford Courant (Mar. 9, 2013)); App. at 
1239 (Kopel, The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine 




The State does not appear to have rebutted the fact that 
magazines holding more than ten rounds are commonly 
owned.7 The commonality of magazines holding more than ten 
rounds fits with findings by other courts as well. See, e.g., 
Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261 (“We think it clear enough in the 
record that semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding more 
than ten rounds are indeed in ‘common use,’ as the plaintiffs 
contend” because “fully 18 percent of all firearms owned by 
civilians in 1994 were equipped with magazines holding more 
than ten rounds, and approximately 4.7 million more such 
magazines were imported into the United States between 1995 
and 2000.”).  
c.  Regulating Magazine Capacity 
With the history of magazines and magazine-equipped 
firearms as a guide, I next consider traditional regulation. 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 627; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 
(reaffirming that Heller “did not cast doubt on . . . longstanding 
regulatory measures” and “does not imperil every law 
regulating firearms”). That analysis first requires answering 
how a prohibition can be “traditional” or “longstanding” when 
it regulates arms of the modern era. That is because Heller 
permits “[s]tate and local experimentation with reasonable 
firearms regulations.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785 (alteration 
in original). Logically, then, “when legislatures seek to address 
 
7 One of the State’s experts also conceded the readily 
available nature of “large capacity magazines.” (NJ Rifle I 
App. at 195 (“Many of the mass shooters did not seek out large 
capacity magazines, they just used what was easily available, 
and it would have been hard or impossible for many of those 




new weapons that have not traditionally existed or to impose 
new gun regulations because of conditions that have not 
traditionally existed, there obviously will not be a history or 
tradition of banning such weapons or imposing such 
regulations.” Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J. 
dissenting).  
Instead, I believe “the proper interpretive approach is to 
reason by analogy from history and tradition.” Id. (citing 
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (“[J]ust as the First Amendment free speech clause 
covers modern communication devices unknown to the 
founding generation, e.g., radio and television, and the Fourth 
Amendment protects telephonic conversation from a ‘search,’ 
the Second Amendment protects the possession of the modern-
day equivalents of the colonial pistol.”), aff’d sub nom. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570; Tr. of Oral Arg. at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(Chief Justice Roberts: “[Y]ou would define ‘reasonable’ in 
light of the restrictions that existed at the time the amendment 
was adopted. . . . [Y]ou can’t take it into the marketplace was 
one restriction. So that would be—we are talking about lineal 
descendants of the arms but presumably there are lineal 
descendants of the restrictions as well.”); cf. Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–35 (2001) (applying traditional Fourth 
Amendment standards to novel thermal imaging technology); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (allowing 
government to view property from airplanes based on 
common-law principle that police could look at property when 
passing by homes on public thoroughfares)). So I turn to 
historical regulation of both magazines and other restrictions 




Limits on ammunition capacity emerged during the 
Prohibition Era, when six states adopted restrictions.8 See also 
Kopel, The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine 
Prohibitions, 78 Alb. L. Rev. at 864–68 (internal footnotes and 
citations omitted). But all were repealed over time. Only the 
District of Columbia maintained an uninterrupted ban on semi-
automatic magazines holding more than twelve rounds from 
1932 until 1975, when it banned all functional firearms in the 
home and handguns altogether. (See Amici Professors Br. at 33 
(citing Pub. L. No. 72-275, §§ 1, 8, 47 Stat. 650, 650, 652).)  
New Jersey first limited magazine capacity to fifteen 
rounds in 1990. Kopel, The History of Firearm Magazines and 
Magazine Prohibitions, 78 Alb. L. Rev. at 867 (citing Act of 
May 30, 1990, ch. 32, §§ 2C:39-1(y), -3(j), 1990 N.J. Laws 
 
8 These states include California, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Virginia. (See Amici Professors Br. at 
31–32 (citing 1927 R.I. Pub. Laws 256, §§ 1, 4 (banning sales 
of guns able to fire more than twelve shots without reloading); 
1927 Mich. Pub. Acts ch. 372, § 3 (banning sales of firearms 
“which can be fired more than sixteen times without 
reloading”); 1933 Minn. Laws ch. 190 (banning “machine 
gun[s],” including semi-automatics “which have been 
changed, altered or modified to increase the magazine capacity 
from the original design as manufactured by the 
manufacturers”); 1933 Ohio Laws 189 (requiring a license for 
semi-automatics with capacity of more than 18); 1933 Cal. 
Laws, ch. 450 (requiring license for machine guns, which were 
defined to include semi-automatics with detachable magazines 
of more than ten rounds); 1934 Va. Acts ch. 96 s137, §§ 1(a), 
4(d) (defining machine guns as anything able to fire more than 




217, 221, 235 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-1(y), -3(j) 
(West 2014)). Around the same time, Hawaii enacted a 
limitation of ten rounds. (See NJ Rifle I App. at 9 (citing Haw. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-(8)).) A few years later, Congress passed 
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
prohibiting the possession or transfer of magazines holding 
more than ten rounds. See Pub. L. 103-322, § 110103 (Sep. 13, 
1994). But that law expired in 2004 and has never been 
reauthorized. Since then, states including California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New 
Jersey have enacted or maintained regulations limiting 
magazine capacity. See Kopel, The History of Firearm 
Magazines and Magazine Prohibitions, 78 Alb. L. Rev. at 867–
68.  
This history reveals a long gap between the 
development and commercial distribution of magazines, on the 
one hand, and limiting regulations, on the other hand. The State 
reasons, “It is logical that state limits on such weapons do not 
predate their popularity.” (NJ Rifle I Response Br. at 22.) That 
is doubtful, as New Jersey has actively regulated firearms 
lacking any popular use. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:39-
3(m) (prohibiting “[c]overt or undetectable firearms,” such as 
3D printed firearms); Guidelines Regarding the “Substantially 
Identical” Provision in the State’s Assault Firearms Laws, N.J. 
Att’y Gen. Op. (August 1996) (prohibiting “bayonet mounts” 
on rifles). At any rate, the State concedes that magazine-
equipped rifles first achieved “mass-market success” in the 
1860s and magazine-equipped handguns achieved similar 
success in the 1930s. (NJ Rifle I Response Br. at 22.) Yet 
regulations did not grow until the 1990s and 2000s, and even 
today, only a handful of states limit magazine capacity. Given 




these first regulations by at least fifty years, I do not see 
evidence of the longstanding tradition required under Heller to 
remove magazines from the protection of the Second 
Amendment. Cf. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 
2013) (holding New Jersey’s permit requirement was 
longstanding because its origins dated to 1924). Nor is it clear 
that there is a longstanding tradition of regulating magazines 
as “dangerous and unusual.” For one thing, more than eight 
states would have rushed to regulate magazine capacity 
following the end of the federal ban in 2004.  
Some will argue there must be an outer boundary to this 
analysis that, when crossed, renders a magazine dangerous and 
unusual. If so, it does not appear in the history and traditions 
of our Nation. But in any event that question is not before us. 
So while “[t]here may well be some capacity above which 
magazines are not in common use . . . the record is devoid of 
evidence as to what that capacity is.” Heller II, 670 F.3d at 
1261 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). As a result, and limited to 
this record, I would hold that magazines are arms protected by 
the Second Amendment and an act limiting magazine capacity 
to ten rounds burdens the Appellants’ Second Amendment 
rights.  
2.  Step Two: Evaluating the Challenged Law 
Under Means-End Scrutiny 
Although not required by Heller, our precedent uses 
some form of means-end scrutiny. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
at 96–97. Marzzarella does not insist on a uniform standard in 
all cases. Rather, we observed that if, like the First 
Amendment, “the Second Amendment can trigger more than 
one particular standard of scrutiny,” then intermediate scrutiny 




“fundamental interest protected by the [Second 
Amendment]—the defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 97. By 
extension, strict scrutiny should be applied when a challenged 
law does burden such a fundamental interest. I conclude that 
the New Jersey Magazine Act burdens the right to maintain 
operable protected arms without regard to location or 
circumstances, warranting strict scrutiny. But regardless of the 
level of scrutiny applied, the state does not satisfy its burden 
on this record. 
 i. Strict Scrutiny  
As the Supreme Court has not applied the tiers of 
scrutiny to gun regulations, see Heller, 554 U.S. at 634, “we 
look to other constitutional areas for guidance in evaluating 
Second Amendment challenges.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 
n.4. Using this rationale, we concluded “the First Amendment 
is the natural choice. Heller itself repeatedly invokes the First 
Amendment in establishing principles governing the Second 
Amendment.” Id.  
Cases considering restrictions on speech and expression 
hold the appropriate level of scrutiny is a fact-specific inquiry 
tied to the type of regulation at issue. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral time, place, and 
manner restrictions in a public forum); Zauderer v. Off. of 
Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Oh., 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985) (applying rational basis review to disclosure 
requirements for commercial speech). Strict scrutiny applies to 
content-based restrictions that infringe on the First 
Amendment’s core guarantee. See, e.g., Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (applying strict scrutiny in the 




Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (applying strict 
scrutiny in context of content-based speech restriction). So 
following the direction of Marzzarella, strict scrutiny applies 
to restrictions burdening rights at the core of the Second 
Amendment. See NJ Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 134 (Bibas, J., 
dissenting). 
One of the Second Amendment’s core purposes is to 
protect the “use [of] arms in defense of hearth and home.” 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 591, 636. For that reason, prohibiting 
operable firearms in the home violates the Second 
Amendment. Id. The same result applies here, because the New 
Jersey Magazine Act prohibits the possession of magazines 
exceeding ten rounds at all times, including inside the home for 
defense. The State argues that the Act “does not ban 
magazines; it imposes a restriction on the capacity of a single 
magazine that can be inserted into a firearm” and does not 
restrict the number of magazines an individual may possess. 
(NJ Rifle I Response Br. at 34–35.) That is only partially 
correct, as it leaves owners of a “noncompliant” magazine 
without an operating firearm. But even assuming the Act is not 
a categorical ban on all magazines, it still burdens a core 
Second Amendment right without exception or limitation, 
including the defense of “hearth and home” specifically noted 
in Heller. Following our prior analogy to decisions applying 
the First Amendment jurisprudence, this “ban on a class of 
arms is not an ‘incidental’ regulation. It is equivalent to a ban 
on a category of speech.” See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1285 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also NJ Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 127 
(Bibas, J., dissenting) (“I would apply strict scrutiny to any law 





New Jersey has not offered record evidence meeting 
that test. “Strict scrutiny asks whether the law is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96 n.14. When “a less restrictive 
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the 
legislature must use that alternative.” Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 
U.S. at 813. As Judge Bibas observed, “[h]ere, the government 
has offered no concrete evidence that magazine restrictions 
have saved or will save potential victims. Nor has it made any 
showing of tailoring.” NJ Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 134 (Bibas, J., 
dissenting). New Jersey once imposed a fifteen-round limit on 
magazine capacity. Now it claims ten is essential for public 
safety. The Second Amendment demands more than back-of-
the-envelope math. At a minimum, it asks the government to 
explain, to offer but one example, why eleven rounds is too 
many while nine remains fine. Unless competent evidence 
answers those questions, New Jersey cannot show why a ten-
round limit is the least restrictive means of achieving public 
safety. For this reason, I would hold that the Act fails to satisfy 
strict scrutiny. 
ii.  Intermediate Scrutiny 
For largely the same reasons, the New Jersey Magazine 
Act does not satisfy intermediate scrutiny where “the 
government’s asserted interest must be more than just 
legitimate but need not be compelling. It must be ‘significant, 
substantial, or important.’” Drake, 724 F.3d at 436 (quoting 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98). “‘[T]he fit’ between the asserted 
interest and the challenged law need not be ‘perfect,’ but it 
must be ‘reasonable’ and ‘may not burden more [conduct] than 
is reasonably necessary.’” Id. (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 




Here, the record does not show the State reasonably 
tailored the regulation to serve its interest in public safety 
without burdening more conduct than reasonably necessary. 
First, the State rests on the ambiguous argument that “when 
LCM-equipped firearms are used, more bullets are fired, more 
victims are shot, and more people are killed than in other gun 
attacks.” (NJ Rifle I Response Br. at 28.) Perhaps, but “this still 
begs the question of whether a 10-round limit on magazine 
capacity will affect the outcomes of enough gun attacks to 
measurably reduce gun injuries and death.” (NJ Rifle I App. at 
1280 (Christopher S. Koper, An Updated Assessment of the 
Federal Assault Weapons Ban 89 (2004)).) In fact, “studies 
suggest that state-level [assault-weapon] bans have not reduced 
crime[.]” (NJ Rifle I App. at 1272, Koper, supra at 81 n.95.) 
Second, as Judge Bibas observed, “since 1990 New 
Jersey has banned magazines that hold more than fifteen 
bullets. The ban affects everyone. The challengers do not 
contest that ban. And there is no evidence of its efficacy, one 
way or the other.” NJ Rifle I, 910 F.3d at 132 (Bibas, J., 
dissenting). Third, statistics in the record report that out of 
sixty-one “mass shootings,”9 eleven used fifteen-round 
 
9 The term “mass shootings” does not appear to have an 
objective definition. See, e.g., NJ Rifle I App. at 1042, Louis 
Klarevas, Rampage Nation: Securing America From Mass 
Shootings (2016) (defining mass shootings as “attacks that 
resulted in six or more people—not including the 
perpetrator(s)—dying as a result of gunshot wounds”) 
(emphasis in original); App. at 1067, Cong. Rsch. Serv., Mass 
Murder with Firearms: Incidents and Victims, 1999-2013 





magazines, two used fourteen-round magazines, and two used 
thirteen-round magazines. That alone casts doubt on the ten-
round tailoring. As does the declaration of  the Commissioner 
of the Baltimore Police Department’s stating that the use of a 
ten round magazine offers more opportunities to intervene in a 
shooting incident than if “30- or 50-round magazines, or 100-
round drums” are used. (NJ Rifle I App. at 865.) (emphasis 
added). So too, of course, would use of a magazine holding 
eleven or twenty-nine rounds. That is why narrow tailoring 
requires more than a ninety-round spread in logic.10   
 
incident in which four or more victims are murdered with 
firearms—not including the offender(s)—within one event, 
and in one or more locations in close geographical proximity); 
App. at 1118, Violence Pol’y Ctr., High-Capacity Ammunition 
Magazines are the Common Thread Running Through Most 
Mass Shootings in the United States (defining “mass shooting” 
as “3 or more fatalities”). 
10 Diving deeper, the record evidence casts doubt on the 
State’s intervention theory. For example, “it takes two to four 
seconds for shooters to eject an expended magazine from a 
semi-automatic gun, insert a loaded magazine, and make the 
gun ready to fire.” (NJ Rifle I App. at 1197, Declaration of 
Gary Kleck in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 12). Investigations from criminal attacks show 
“that the killers typically do not fire at high rates, instead firing 
deliberately, at rates far below the fastest rates that can be 
maintained with semiautomatic weapons.” (NJ Rifle I App. at 
1203, Kleck Decl. at 18.) In fact, “[t]he average interval 
between shots in mass shootings . . . is nearly always more than 





All of this leads to one conclusion: “the Government 
bears the burden of proof on the appropriateness of the means 
it employs to further its interest[,]” but “the Government falls 
well short of satisfying its burden—even under intermediate 
scrutiny.” Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 353 (3d Cir. 
2016) (en banc). New Jersey must “present some meaningful 
evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its predictive [and here 
conclusory] judgments[,]” and it failed to meet that burden 
here. Id. at 354 (alteration in original) (citing Heller II, 670 
F.3d at 1259); see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc, 804 
F.3d 242, 264 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[O]n intermediate scrutiny 
review, the state cannot ‘get away with shoddy data or 
reasoning.’ To survive intermediate scrutiny, the defendants 
must show ‘reasonable inferences based on substantial 
evidence’ that the statutes are substantially related to the 
governmental interest.”) (emphasis in original) (internal 
citations omitted).  
For these reasons, I would hold that the Act cannot 
satisfy intermediate, or any applicable level of, scrutiny. 
III. RECONSIDERING MARZZARELLA AND TIERED SCRUTINY 
 
not even slow the shooter’s rate of fire.” (NJ Rifle I App. at 
1203, Kleck Decl. at 18.) Shooters can “avoid the necessity of 
reloading by carrying several firearms, carry[ing] several 
magazines which can be exchanged quickly, or simply tak[ing] 
the time to reload.” (NJ Rifle I App. at 748, Carlisle E. Moody, 
Large Capacity Magazines and Homicide, 160 C. Wm. & Mary 
Working Paper 6, 6 (2015).) Crediting all of this testimony 
seems to undermine the State’s theory, and suggests that 




 Decided two years after Heller, our decision in 
Marzzarella ushered in a two-part framework for analyzing the 
Second Amendment. That test has proved popular, and is now 
used by a majority of circuit courts. But our approach has come 
into question, and I have serious doubts that it can be squared 
with Heller. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1867 
(2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the two-
part framework as “rais[ing] numerous concerns” that “yield[] 
analyses that are entirely inconsistent with Heller”); N.Y. State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 
1540 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that Heller is 
based “on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms as it was 
understood at the time of the adoption of the Second 
Amendment”); id. at 1527 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“I 
share Justice Alito’s concern that some federal and state courts 
may not be properly applying Heller and McDonald.”). I reach 
that conclusion on two grounds.  
 First, the widespread popularity of the two-step 
balancing test does not address the clear repudiation of interest-
balancing by the Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald. 
When twice presented with the opportunity to import tiered 
scrutiny from decisions considering the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court instead focused on text, history, and tradition. 
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (declining to apply a specified level 
of scrutiny and observing that “[w]e know of no other 
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been 
subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”); 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785 (“[W]e expressly rejected the 
argument that the scope of the Second Amendment right 
should be determined by judicial interest balancing”); 
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 378 (Hardiman, J., concurring) 




challenge against an absolute ban—after it has already been 
established that the individual has a right to keep and bear 
arms—eviscerates that right via judicial interest balancing in 
direct contravention of Heller.”). 
 Second, this historical approach is significant because, 
as Heller explains, “it has always been widely understood” that 
“[t]he very text of the Second Amendment implicitly 
recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that 
it ‘shall not be infringed.’” Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 
(quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876)) 
(“This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in 
any manner dependent upon that instrument for its 
existence.”); see also Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 
(1897) (“The law is perfectly well settled that the first 10 
amendments to the constitution . . . were not intended to lay 
down any novel principles of government, but simply to 
embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had 
inherited from our English ancestors[.]”). And rather than 
turning to the reservoir of decisions, doctrines, and debates 
flowing from generations of First Amendment cases and tiered 
tolerance of governmental speech restraints, Heller “pores over 
early sources to show that while preventing Congress from 
eliminating state militias was the ‘purpose that prompted the 
[Amendment’s] codification,’” that purpose did not limit the 
right’s substance. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 
658 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 600). At its 
core, the Second Amendment recognizes the widely accepted 
principle at the Founding that the right to self-defense derived 
directly from the natural right to life, giving the people 
predictable protections for securing the “Blessings of Liberty.” 




2.11 So “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes out of the 
hands of government—even the Third Branch of 
Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether the right is really worth insisting upon.” Heller, 554 
U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original). 
 For those reasons, I would follow what I believe to be 
the direction of the Supreme Court and focus our approach 
“based on text, history, and tradition” rather “than under an 
interest-balancing test.” Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 
(Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The law-of-the-case doctrine can serve important, 
practical purposes in litigation. But it remains a prudential rule 
 
11 Several Founding Era documents reflect this 
sentiment. Hamilton wrote in Federalist Paper 28 that the 
“original right of self-defense” is “paramount to all positive 
forms of government.” The Federalist No. 28, at 146 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Colonial Press, ed., 1901). Similarly, 
Samuel Adams listed self-preservation under “Natural Rights 
of the Colonists as Men”: “First, a right to life; Secondly, to 
liberty; Thirdly, to property; together with the right to support 
and defend them in the best manner they can.” Samuel Adams, 
The Rights of the Colonists: The Report of the Committee of 
Correspondence to the Boston Town Meeting Nov. 20, 1772 
reprinted in Old South Leaflets no. 173 (Directors of the Old 
South Work 1906). Those sentiments, in turn, echo the 
classical understanding that “[s]elf-defence, therefore, as it is 
justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can 
it be in fact, taken away by the law of society.” 3 William 




that “merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse 
to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power.” 
Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). I would 
decline to invoke that discretion here, as I conclude that 
determining whether magazines enjoy the guarantees of the 
Second Amendment, and whether that protection varies based 
on their capacity, would “not reopen issues decided in earlier 
stages of the same litigation.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 
236 (1997). Both issues affect the rights of individuals 
throughout our Circuit. Likewise, resolving those questions 
will allow state governments to design public safety solutions 
that respect the freedoms guarded by the Second Amendment. 
So I would reverse the order of the District Court, hold that 
magazines are arms under the Constitution, and remand this 
matter to permit the State to provide evidence that the Act is 
narrowly tailored to advance the State’s interests. For these 
reasons, I respectfully dissent.    
 
